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RULE 14A-8(I)(10): HOW SUBSTANTIAL IS “SUB-
STANTIALLY” IMPLEMENTED IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL 
POLICY PROPOSALS? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Rule 14a-8 (the Rule) allows shareholders to include proposals in 
the company’s proxy statement. The Rule also has thirteen substantive 
grounds for exclusion, with the burden on the company to demonstrate 
proper reliance to omit a proposal.1 Subsection (i)(10) (14a-8(i)(10)) 
allows exclusion of proposals “substantially implemented” by the com-
pany.2 
Originally applicable to proposals deemed moot, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the SEC or Commission) added the provision to 
the Rule in 1976.3 The exclusion at first permitted the omission of pro-
posals “fully effected.”4 A mandated change in administrative interpreta-
tion extended the exclusion to proposals “substantially implemented.”5 
The change led to increasingly inconsistent determinations by an over-
burdened SEC staff.   
This paper will trace the administrative history of 14a-8(i)(10), in-
cluding the impact of amendments to the provision. Next, the paper will 
analyze the current staff interpretation of the subsection through no ac-
tion letters issued in the new millennium. Finally, this paper will suggest 
strategies for drafting proposals and provide insight into how the staff’s 
current role hinders shareholder participation in the proxy process. 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 
Prior to 1976, SEC staff allowed for the exclusion of shareholder 
proposals from proxy statements for mootness.6 The Commission treated 
proposals as moot where the company complied7 or intended to comply8 
  
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(g) (2011). 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(10) (2011). 
 3. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders, Release No. 12999 
(Nov. 22, 1976). 
 4. Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Pro-
posals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-20091 (Aug. 16, 1983). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-
12999 (Nov. 22, 1976). 
 7. New Mexico & Arizona Land Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9126 (Feb. 8, 1973) 
(Company passed resolution “effectuating the intended objective of the proposal.”); Electronics 
Corp. of Am., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 21154 (Jan. 16, 1974) (“[P]roposal is moot because 
the company is already submitting a full post-meeting report to its shareholders.”); Long Island 
Lighting Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 6949 (Mar. 1, 1974) (“[P]roposal mandates action 
that will have already been implemented by the company.”); Warnco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
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with the substance of the proposal. The staff’s strict interpretation of 
mootness barred exclusion where the company’s actions varied, even 
slightly, from the terms of proposal.9 
The SEC integrated informal staff interpretations for mootness into 
the Rule in 1976.10 The Commission proposed to allow for the exclusion 
of shareholder proposals from proxy materials where they “[had] been 
rendered moot by the actions of management.”11 The Proposing Release 
explained this change was “designed to avoid the possibility of share-
holders having to consider matters which already have been favorably 
acted upon by the management,”12 including situations where manage-
ment agreed “to implement a proponent's proposal in its entirety.”13 
The final rule abandoned the reference to “actions of management.” 
The Commission reasoned, “mootness can be caused for reasons other 
than the actions of management, such as statutory enactments, court de-
cisions, business changes and supervening corporate events.”14 For ex-
ample, when a “Company is already legally bound to carry out the action 
called for by the proposal,” specific actions need not be taken by man-
  
1975 WL 9919 (Apr. 4, 1975) (Proposal requests “action that has already been taken by the Compa-
ny's Board of Directors.”); Northrop Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9938 (May 24, 1975) 
(“[T]here appears to be some basis for the opinion of your counsel that the first proposal of Mr. 
McCrea may be excluded on the ground of mootness, since it requests action that appears to have 
been taken by the Company's Board of Directors.”). 
 8. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9116 (Feb. 1, 1973) (Company 
“has agreed to comply with the substance of the proposal.”); Consumers Power Co., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1973 WL 8481 (1973) (Company “has taken steps to comply with [proposals] terms.”); Gen. 
Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9132 (Feb. 15, 1973) (“[C]ompany already provides, or 
will provide subject to the terms of the proposal, the information requested in the proposal.”); Elba 
Sys. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9198 (July 23, 1973) (“[C]ompany will take steps to 
comply with the terms of the proposal.”); Gen. Refractories Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 
8863 (Feb. 22, 1974) (Company “intends to comply with his proposal.”). 
 9. First Equity Fin. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9200 (Oct. 15, 1973) (Share-
holders proposed that the company actively seek merger. Staff denied no action relief where “[t]he 
board’s prior action of setting up a committee ‘to receive proposals by other firms . . . regarding 
mergers or acquisitions’ and giving such committee the power ‘to institute discussions with other 
companies’ would not appear to conform to the request made in the proposal.”); United Presbyterian 
Church, SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 6954 (Jan. 29, 1974) (Shareholders proposed creation of a 
South African Review Committee to issue reports and make recommendations regarding company 
activities in South Africa. Staff denied relief because the company’s “Public Issues Committee 
involves only the review of ‘the (c)ompany's posture, policies, programs and practices on public 
issues of significance... as they may affect the operations of the (c)ompany.’”); Northrop Corp., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 9938 (May 24, 1975) (Shareholders proposed that the company “affirm 
the political non-partisanship of the Corporation” and staff denied relief because “practices set forth 
in paragraph nos. 2, 4 and 5 of the proposal are not specifically referred to either in the Resolution or 
the Statement of Policy, and that one might not necessarily imply from those documents that such 
practices are prohibited.”). 
 10. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating 
to Proposals by Security Holders (S7-643), Release No. 12598, 9 SEC Docket 1030 (July 7, 1976). 
 11. Id. at *1035. 
 12. Id. at *1035.  
 13. Id. at *1035. 
 14. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-
12999 (Nov. 22, 1976). 
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agement for the proposal to be rendered moot.15 Thus, proposals “ren-
dered moot for whatever reason” were “excludable from an issuer's 
proxy materials.”16 
Following adoption of the amendment, the staff granted no action 
relief where the companies took action that “exactly encompass[ed]” a 
proposal’s considerations.17 Companies could exclude proposals seeking 
“to create a situation which already exist[ed]”18 or that had already “been 
undertaken by the Company.”19 Consequently, even modest differences 
between a proposal and the company’s implementation resulted in the 
inapplicability of the exclusion. 
As a result, the mootness exclusion did not apply when a sharehold-
er proposed a permanent change to corporate bylaws and the company 
agreed to implementation only for a specified period of time.20 Similarly, 
the staff found that a proposal requesting annual reports to “include a 
summary of the charitable contributions by the corporation and the per-
centage relationship of the total to pretax domestic earnings” was not 
moot even though the company disclosed the amount of charitable con-
tributions and a shareholder could compute the percentage based on other 
information in the report.21 
The Commission ultimately intervened to overturn what it per-
ceived as an excessively narrow and inflexible interpretation. The Com-
mission did so not by amending the language of the subsection but by 
altering the staff’s interpretation. To be excluded, proposals did not have 
to be “fully” effected but only “substantially implemented.”22 Although 
more subjective, the Commission reasoned that the approach would pre-
vent “abuse of the security holder process” by preventing shareholders 
from circumventing exclusion by submitting proposals that only varied 
slightly from existing policies.23 Despite objections to the change,24 the 
  
 15. Upjohn Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 11675, at *7 (Feb. 25, 1977). 
 16. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-
12999 (Nov. 22, 1976). 
 17. Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 26569, at *2 (Mar. 9, 
1981). 
 18. Bethlehem Steel Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 10593, at *7 (Dec. 6, 1978). 
 19. S. California Edison Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 12585, at *7 (Dec. 20, 1978). 
 20. Int’l Tel. and Tel. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30878, at *2 (Mar. 7, 1983) 
(Proposal calling for annual meetings to be held in the US was not rendered moot by the company’s 
decision to do so at the next meeting. “[T]he proposal submitted by the Proponent refers to a perma-
nent, fixed date for all future annual meetings, while the action taken by the Company refers exclu-
sively to setting the date for the upcoming annual meeting.”). See also Id. at *1 (The staff denied 
relief in the same no action letter where shareholders proposed that all annual meetings be held in 
the United States and the company agreed to provide live two-way satellite transmission from Lon-
don. Even though attendees could watch and participate from the United States, the staff reasoned 
that this was not “equivalent to holding the meeting itself in the United States.”). 
 21. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25774 (Jan. 16, 1981).  
 22. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Release No. 12734, 26 SEC Docket 494 (Oct. 14, 
1982). 
 23. Id. 
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Commission concluded that the staff’s interpretation was “more restric-
tive than [was] necessary to achieve the purposes of the rule”25 and 
adopted the new interpretation.26 
The Release provided little useful guidance on the meaning of sub-
stantially implemented, leaving the interpretation to the staff.27 Where 
management implemented a proposal in all material respects, the staff 
had little difficulty issuing the requisite no action letter.28 Topics unrelat-
ed to the company’s business likewise were routinely excluded.29 In oth-
er cases, however, the staff struggled with whether the difference be-
tween the shareholder proposal and the action by management varied in a 
substantial fashion. 
For example, the staff allowed for exclusion on the basis of de min-
imus variations. In Eastman Kodak, shareholders sought disclosure of 
“all fines paid for violations of environmental laws and regulations” in 
the past five years.30 The staff agreed to the company’s requested no 
action relief, noting that compliance with Item 103 of regulation S-K 
  
 24. The Commission did so over the objection of at least some on the staff. Memorandum to 
Lee. B. Spencer, Jr., from Bill Morley, Proposed Revision of Rule 14a-8, at 20 (Mar. 18, 1982), 
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-
5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1980/1982_0318_Morl
eyKargula.pdf (“[I]t has been suggested that we should go to a test of permitting the exclusion of 
proposals where the company is doing substantially what the proponents asks. We would recom-
mend that such a test not be applied. We already have enough trouble with rests based on ‘signifi-
cantly’ and ‘substantially’ without increasing the number of situations where we have to make 
subjective judgments. The provision as interpreted may limit its usefulness, but at least everyone has 
a good idea of how it will be interpreted.”). See also Leila N. Sadat-Keeling, The 1983 Amendments 
to Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8: A Retreat from Corporate Democracy?, 59 TUL. L. REV. 161, 
190 (Oct. 1984) (“Sixty-five of seventy-nine commentators addressing this issue were in favor of 
this change, with those opposed concerned primarily with the subjectivity involved in determining 
whether a proposal had been ‘substantially implemented.’”). 
 25. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8, Release No. 12734, 26 SEC Docket 494 (Oct. 14, 
1982). 
 26. Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Pro-
posals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-20091 (Aug. 16, 1983). 
 27. The SEC also sought to increase the subjectivity of the exclusion by adding a “good faith” 
test. The proposed amendment would allow for exclusion where the “board of directors considered 
the request in good faith and determined not to act.” Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-20091 (Aug. 
16, 1983). Due to the difficulty of administering the test however, the Commission did not to add the 
“good faith” test to this subsection. Id. 
 28. Digital Equip. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 426412 (July 30, 1996); Am. 
Stores Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176968 (Apr. 8, 1991). 
 29. The staff also interpreted “substantially implemented” to apply where the proposal in-
volved a topic unrelated to the company’s activities. For example, the staff denied relief where 
shareholders requested an annual report disclosing risks and estimates of “base load power plants.” 
Duke Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65300 (Feb. 26, 1986). The company represented 
that it had no intention of building these types of plants. Id. Similarly, the staff granted relief where 
the proposal requested the company to stop purchasing human fetuses and the company did not, and 
did not plan to, buy human fetuses. Eli Lilly Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 32992 (Jan. 25, 
1999). 
 30. Eastman Kodak Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176616, at *4 (Feb. 1, 1991) 
(Shareholder’s proposal). 
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required the company to disclose, publically, all fines other than de min-
imus amounts.31 
Similarly, companies could exclude proposals where the company 
was already performing the relevant task. For example, shareholders 
proposed that the board of directors “establish a healthcare compliance 
committee.”32 The staff found substantial implementation because the 
company had an “ethics, compliance, and corporate responsibility” 
committee and “empowered and required an executive officer to address 
the issue of healthcare compliance.”33  
At the same time, the staff denied no action relief where modest dif-
ferences existed between the proposal and company practices. For exam-
ple, shareholders sought disclosure of attendance of outside directors at 
board and committee meetings.34 The proposal would require the names 
and actual attendance of all outside directors.35 The staff found that the 
company’s requirement to disclose names of directors who attended 75% 
or fewer meetings did not constitute substantial implementation.36 
The staff also barred exclusion where the company’s actions failed 
to satisfy the proposal’s overall objective. For example, shareholders 
requested that an independent third party receive and tabulate proxies to 
“insure that all voting materials which identify shareholders be kept per-
manently confidential.”37 The corporation argued for substantial imple-
mentation by pointing to the existing use of an independent third party to 
receive and tabulate proxies.38 The staff found the proposal had not been 
substantially implemented because corporate policies did not envision an 
“overall system of confidentiality.”39 
In 1998, the Commission amended the subsection to reflect current 
staff interpretation by replacing mootness with “substantially implement-
  
 31. Eastman Kodak Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 176616 (Feb. 1, 1991). 
 32. The Columbia/hca Healthcare Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 80223 (Feb. 18, 
1998). 
 33. Id. Exclusion was also granted where shareholders requested the company form a commit-
tee “to establish corporate environmental and occupational safety and health policy,” because the 
company already had a committee to “to address safety, health and environmental issues” in one 
action. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286089 (Feb. 12, 1990). 
Exclusion was similarly granted where the company had a committee to recommend and adopt 
polices “relating to environmental and employee safety issues” in different request for relief. Chev-
ron Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286048 (Feb. 14, 1990). Likewise, omission was grant-
ed where the proposal sought formation of a committee to “study and develop criteria for the ac-
ceptance and execution the Company's military contracts.” Gen. Dynamics Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1992 WL 77633 (Mar. 12, 1992). The staff noted that the company already had in place 
various committees accountable for the issues. Id. 
 34. Playboy Ent., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28578 (Aug. 18, 1983). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. First Bank Sys., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 43421, at *1 (Feb. 27, 1992). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at *1. 
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ed.”40 Despite the shift in language, the SEC noted that the revision “re-
flect[ed] an interpretation that we adopted in 1983.”41 Thus, the modifi-
cation did not result in a substantive change to the interpretation of the 
exclusion.42 
III. STAFF INTERPRETATION 
The requirement of substantial implementation has proved particu-
larly difficult in the context of proposals relating to social policy. The 
staff often must determine whether the company’s existing “policies, 
practices, and procedures compare favorably with the guidelines of the 
proposal.”43 To do so, the company’s policies must “satisfactorily [ad-
dress] both the proposal’s underlying concerns and its essential objec-
tive(s),”44 with small or immaterial differences disregarded.45 In analyz-
ing the issue, the staff will consider employee handbooks, governing 
principles, public disclosures, and other actions the corporation has taken 
on the issue at hand.46 
a. Adherence to Third Party Principles 
Shareholders occasionally submit proposals that recommend adher-
ence to standards or principles created by third parties. Shareholders 
have submitted proposals seeking the implementation of standards set by 
the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO developed guide-
lines designed to limit exploitation of workers and provide a safe, fair, 
and ethical workplace.47 The staff has considered arguments that 14a-
8(i)(10) justified exclusion in seventeen no action letters addressing pro-
posals seeking the adoption of ILO standards.48 Only once did the staff 
agree to permit exclusion.49 
  
 40. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-40018 (May 28, 1998). 
 41. Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-40018 (May 28, 1998).  
 42. The only additional change has been the addition of a note to (i)(10) to allow for the 
exclusion of proposals that sought say-on-pay votes in certain circumstances. Shareholder Approval 
of Executive Comp. & Golden Parachute Comp., Release No. 9178 (Jan. 25, 2011). 
 43. Texaco Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1991 WL 178690, at *1 (Mar. 28, 1991). See also 
J.M. Smucker Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 1787182 (May 9, 2011). 
 44. 1 Publicly Traded Corporations Handbook § 10:23 (2015). 
 45. Where a proposal sought that McDonald’s purchase at least 5 percent of its eggs from 
cage-free hens, the staff found that the company had substantially implemented the proposal since 
4.72 percent of the eggs purchased were from cage-free hens. McDonald's Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 2008 WL 698915 (Mar. 12, 2008). The staff felt that the discrepancy between 4.72% and 5% 
was an immaterial difference and thus the proposal had been substantially implemented. Id. 
 46. Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 364995 (Mar. 13, 2015) (public 
disclosures); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 1256519 (Mar. 30, 2010) 
(internal policies; governing principles); McDonald's Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 
263003 (Jan. 21, 2014) (corporate guidelines). 
 47. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, ABOUT THE ILO, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (Last visited Feb. 2016). 
 48. Appendix A: ILO No Action Letters, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-
governance/empirical/sharifi-rule-14a-8i10/ILO-NoAL.xlsx. 
 49. Id. 
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One proposal requested that the company present the ILO principles 
in a single accessible place.50 The staff denied no action relief because 
the company followed the policies but did not make them sufficiently 
accessible.51 In some cases, the company’s policies did not sufficiently 
conform to the ILO standards. For example, the staff denied relief where 
a company’s policies required “freedom of association” rather than “col-
lective bargaining” as required by the ILO.52 Likewise, where sharehold-
ers explicitly sought adoption of collective bargaining, the staff denied 
relief despite arguments that the company’s code of conduct mandated 
adherence to local and international laws that already governed collective 
bargaining.53 
In proposing adoption of ILO standards, shareholders often included 
a requirement that the company employ independent and external moni-
toring systems. The staff denied relief as substantially implemented 
where the company already engaged in monitoring but only on an inter-
nal basis,54 failed to disclose whether the monitoring process was internal 
or external,55 or used both internal and external monitoring systems.56 To 
the extent employing outside auditors, however, the staff provided com-
panies with greater flexibility in the selection of the relevant firm.57 
In the only instance the staff granted no action relief, the company 
already covered the main ILO principles.58 The staff found that the re-
quirement that “[w]orkers representatives shall not be the subject of dis-
crimination and shall have access to all workplaces necessary to enable 
them to carry out their representation functions,”59 was substantially im-
plemented by the section of company’s code that read “[w]orkers are free 
to choose whether or not to lawfully organize and join associations. Fac-
tories must not interfere with workers who wish to lawfully and peace-
fully associate, organize or bargain collectively.”60  
The only significant difference was the request by shareholders that 
the company use an external and independent human rights or religious 
organization to monitor workplace conditions of international employ-
  
 50. McDonald's Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 895066 (Mar. 22, 2007). 
 51. McDonald's Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 895066 (Mar. 22, 2007); Sara Lee 
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 22097490 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
 52. Sara Lee Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 22097490 (Sept. 8, 2003). 
 53. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 5248057 (Oct. 23, 2012). 
 54. Revlon, Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1058526 (Apr. 5, 2002); Sara Lee Corp., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2003 WL 22097490 (Sept. 8, 2003); Target Corp. by the New York City 
Employees' Ret. Sys., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 975860 (Apr. 1, 2002). 
 55. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 620060 (Apr. 12, 2010). 
 56. Target Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 975860 (Apr. 1, 2002). 
 57. The Talbots Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1058537 (Apr. 5, 2002). Shareholders 
proposed that the external monitoring be conducted by a “respected human rights” or “religious 
organization” and the staff granted relief where the company had an independent, external firm 
conduct the monitoring, even though the firm was not a human rights or religious organization. Id. 
 58. The Talbots Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1058537 (Apr. 5, 2002). 
 59. Id. at *11 (Shareholder’s proposal). 
 60. Id. at *13. 
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ees.61 The company instead relied only on an external and independent 
compliance firm.62 The staff reasoned that an independent compliance 
firm was sufficient to substantially implement the essential objectives 
(ensure compliance with international employee guidelines) as well as 
the underlying concerns of shareholders (that internal or corporate-
controlled compliance checks could lead to false reports).63 
Aside from ILO principles, the staff has also examined other third 
party standards, such as McBride and CERES principles. In dealing with 
the CERES principles, the staff has not considered “compliance with the 
guidelines on a ‘point-by-point’ basis, but rather on whether a registrant 
appears to have addressed the major themes under the guidelines and 
whether its actions compare favorably with the guidelines.”64 The staff 
would not grant no action relief where the company did not meet its bur-
den of showing it had substantially implemented “the principles of (i) 
periodic disclosure of the issuer's statistical data and (ii) agreeing to be 
subject to a compliance review.”65 
For example, in R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, shareholders re-
quested that the company adhere to certain environmental practices con-
tained in the CERES principles,66 including “periodic disclosure and 
compliance review.”67 Compliance review under the CERES principles 
required external evaluation of environmental performance. The compa-
ny had in place internal review procedures for environmental compliance 
but did not publicly disclose the results.68 Thus, the staff was “unable to 
conclude that the Company’s existing policies, practices and procedures 
with respect to the environment address these guidelines and particularly 
those providing for disclosure and compliance.”69 
b. Sustainability and Related Reports 
Shareholders sometimes propose that a company issue reports, with 
a significant number addressing issues of sustainability and related top-
ics. Sustainability reports delineate the economic, environmental, and 
  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Harold S. Bloomenthal and Samuel Wolff, Proposals Substantially Implemented, 3E SEC. 
& FED. CORP. LAW § 24:124 (2d ed. Mar. 2016). 
 65. Id. 
 66. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 18607 (Jan. 26, 1993). 
CERES Principles include 1. Protection of the biosphere; 2. Sustainable use of natural resources; 3. 
Waste reduction and disposal; 4. Energy conservation; 5. Risk reduction; 6. Safe products and ser-
vices; 7. Environmental restoration; 8. Informing the public; 9. Management commitment; 10. Au-
dits and reports. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 18607 (Jan. 26, 1993). See 
also Sears, Roebuck and Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 80272 (Feb. 16, 1999) (The staff 
denied relief where endorsement of CERES principles was proposed). 
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social impacts caused by the business activities of the company.70 Since 
1998, the staff has considered sixteen no action requests under 14a-
8(i)(10) for proposals seeking sustainability reports and permitted exclu-
sion in ten cases.71 Staff granted relief less often for reports more specific 
than sustainability reports. Since 1998, shareholders have made sixty-
seven proposals regarding publication of various social and environmen-
tal reports, of which the staff granted relief only twenty-two times.72 
The Commission has found substantial implementation where the 
differences between the report requested and the information supplied by 
the company were immaterial. Where a proposal sought “a report on the 
company's response to rising regulatory, competitive and public pressure 
to develop renewable energy technologies and products,”73 the staff 
found substantial implementation through the issuance of a report “relat-
ing to (i) the Company's long-term energy outlook, (ii) greenhouse gas 
emissions, (iii) technology options for the longer term (including as-
sessing the potential of new and alternative energy options), and (iv) 
managing investments and operations through a period of changing ex-
pectations and regulatory uncertainty.”74 The staff viewed as immaterial 
the failure of the report to respond directly to the social changes men-
tioned in the shareholder proposal.75 The exclusion also applied where 
the company used a different method of public disclosure than what 
shareholders requested.76 
The staff granted no action relief more often where the proposal was 
vague with respect to the contents of the report. These situations gave 
management greater latitude to argue for implementation. The staff 
granted relief where a proposal merely recommended a method to use in 
creating sustainability reports, even though the company took a different 
approach.77 In Honeywell International, Inc., the proposal requested the 
  
 70. GRI, ABOUT SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING, 
https://www.globalreporting.org/information/sustainability-reporting/Pages/default.aspx (Last visit-
ed Feb. 2016). 
 71. Appendix B: Sustainability and Related Reports No Action Letters, 
http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/empirical/sharifi-rule-14a-
8i10/Sustainability-NoAL.xlsx. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 945182, at *1 (Mar. 23, 2007). 
 74. Id. at *3 (Company’s letter to SEC on Jan. 18, 2007). 
 75. Id.  
 76. The staff also granted no action relief if the company made public disclosure of the infor-
mation sought, rather than delivery a physical copy of sustainability reports to shareholders. Ac-
ceptable methods of transmission vary. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 
WL 587600 (Mar. 28, 2012) (the corporate website); Honeywell Int'l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2006 WL 435405 (Feb. 21, 2006) (the corporate website); Albertson's, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2005 WL 701614 (Mar. 23, 2005) (Company Profile); Raytheon Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 
WL 212203 (Jan. 25, 2006) (Stewardship Report); Conagra Foods, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
2005 WL 1470572 (May 20, 2005) (Corporate Responsibility Report); Lowe's Companies, Inc., SEC 
No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 678885 (Mar. 21, 2005) (Social Responsibility Report). 
 77. MGM Resorts Int'l, SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 109886 (Feb. 28, 2012). As MGM 
argued, “a company need not implement a proposal in exactly the manner set forth by the proponent. 
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issuance of “a sustainability report to shareholders, at reasonable cost, 
and omitting proprietary information,” but made no explicit mention of 
the need to include quantitative data.78 Even though proponents argued 
that the company's website contained “vague aspirations”79 and “lack[ed] 
any hard data,”80 the staff granted the requested relief.81 
Likewise, shareholders proposed that Caterpillar prepare a global 
warming report but did not suggest a format.82 Instead, the proposal stat-
ed that the report “may describe and discuss” the impacts of Caterpillar’s 
actions on global climate change.83 The staff found as sufficient the an-
nual Sustainability Report that included “detailed information concerning 
the Company's efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and combat 
global warming,” despite the lack of data regarding the impact of Cater-
pillar’s actions.84 
On the other hand, the staff denied no action relief where the com-
pany proposed, but did not undertake, specific methods and disclosures. 
For example, in Wendy’s International, Inc., shareholders requested the 
company use indicators to measure long-term social and environmental 
sustainability.85 The staff denied relief because the company’s Corporate 
Responsibility Report made no mention of these indicators.86 The pro-
posal specifically referenced the need for “substantive and quantitative 
measures.”87  
Similarly, in a no action letter to Lowe’s, shareholders sought dis-
closure of “specific scientific data and studies management relied upon 
to determine the need for policies and expenditures with environmental 
goals and an estimate of the costs and benefits to Lowe's of its sustaina-
bility policy.”88 The company argued that the essential objective of the 
proposal was profit maximization, satisfied by the disclosure of data 
about the benefits wrought from sustainability.89 The staff did not agree 
since the proposal sought “specific scientific data”90 and the cost-benefit 
estimates were only one of the proposal’s essential objectives.91  
  
At any rate, the Proponent has only recommended that the Company use the referenced Guide-
lines…” Id. 
 78. Honeywell Int'l Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 435405, at *8 (Feb. 21, 2006) 
(Shareholder’s proposal). 
 79. Id. at *9 (Shareholder letter to SEC on Jan. 27, 2006). 
 80. Id. at *9 (Shareholder letter to SEC on Jan. 27, 2006). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Caterpillar Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 670183 (Mar. 11, 2008). 
 83. Id. at *5 (Shareholder’s proposal). 
 84. Id. *2 (Company’s letter to SEC on Feb. 1, 2008). 
 85. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 435399 (Feb. 21, 2006). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at *11 (Shareholder’s proposal). 
 88. Lowe's Companies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 331308, at *1 (Jan. 24, 2014). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at *19 (Shareholder’s proposal). 
 91. Id. at *2.  
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SEC staff will also deny relief if the report fails to include all pro-
posed topics. For example, shareholders requested a report on social and 
environmental sustainability.92 The staff denied relief since the compa-
ny’s report contained no information on social sustainability.93 In a simi-
lar situation, the staff declined to issue no action relief where sharehold-
ers requested review of current policies and practices related to environ-
mental, social, and economic sustainability and the company’s publica-
tion did not sufficiently address social and economic sustainability.94  
Similarly, the staff will deny relief where shareholders request re-
ports and the company has not yet taken action. For example, sharehold-
ers proposed that the company disclose actual performance related to 
sustainability.95 The staff denied relief because the company only men-
tioned sustainability as an aspirational goal and had not disclosed actions 
taken.96 The staff also denied no action relief where companies promised 
to issue a report but had not yet done so. For example, shareholders re-
quested issuance of a sustainability report and the company responded by 
indicating plans to issue a Corporate Responsibility Report.97 In denying 
relief, the staff relied on the company’s contentions that the “specific 
form and substance of the report” was undecided and a date for publica-
tion not yet set.98 Likewise, where a company committed to publishing a 
report within the proposed timeframe, the staff denied relief because it 
was “impossible . . . to evaluate whether the non-existent report” would 
contain the information requested.99 
IV. ANALYSIS  
a. Drafting Proposals 
Examination of the staff’s interpretation provides guidance for 
shareholders in drafting and submitting proposals that potentially overlap 
with company policies and practices. Although the staff’s inconsistent 
decisions make it difficult to navigate the boundaries of the exclusion, 
companies and shareholders should be aware of certain strategies.  
First, in drafting a proposal, shareholders should request specific in-
formation from the company, including quantifiable data. Broad requests 
provide the company with greater room to argue that existing policies 
substantially implement the proposal. Greater specificity makes this ar-
gument more difficult. 
  
 92. Boston Properties, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 442364 (Jan. 28, 2011). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Johnson Controls, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 31562565 (Nov. 14, 2002). 
 95. Terex Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 678883 (Mar. 18, 2005). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Burlington Res. Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 310441 (Feb. 4, 2005). 
 98. Id. at *8 (Company’s letter to SEC on Dec. 20, 2004). 
 99. The Kroger Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 871035, at *11 (Mar. 29, 2006) (Share-
holder’s letter to SEC on Mar. 6, 2006). 
312 DENVER LAW REVIEW ONLINE [Vol. 93 
Second, the proposal should specify the method of implementation. 
The staff has consistently allowed for the exclusion of proposals where 
no method was specified, so long as the essential objective was carried 
out. Omission also provides the company with free reign to choose the 
process, which may not result in the shareholder’s intended outcome. 
Thus, specificity can result in more favorable outcomes for shareholders, 
both in terms of the proposal being included in the proxy statement, as 
well as the method of the proposal’s implementation.  
Proposals relying on third party standards appear to reduce the risk 
of exclusion. Introduction of third party principles provides the staff with 
guidance on important considerations and the underlying purpose. In 
drafting the proposal, shareholders may choose to highlight the most 
important aspects of the principles to ensure companies give appropriate 
weight to and do not overlook those standards.  
Last, shareholders should be careful with including non-essential 
considerations in the proposal. Since the staff focuses on the underlying 
concerns and essential objectives in determining substantial implementa-
tion, the company can neglect anything the staff considers non-essential. 
Therefore, shareholders should ensure that the substance of the proposal 
is important to the requested outcome and clear in its objective and rea-
soning.   
b. Staff’s Role 
At its inception, 14a-8(i)(10) had a clear purpose of efficiency—to 
exclude matters that were moot and therefore not worthwhile for inclu-
sion in a company’s proxy statement. This benefitted both the sharehold-
ers and the company. Shareholders did not have to read about, and vote 
on, matters that would have no impact on the company’s operations, and 
companies did not have to waste resources delivering lengthy proxy 
statements and tabulating meaningless votes.  
Over time, however, the Commission altered the purpose of the 
subsection. Although ostensibly premised on efficiency, the staff has 
played an increasing role in using the exclusion to omit proposals with 
overlapping but varying content. Rather than promote efficiency, the 
staff has supplanted shareholders by making subjective determinations 
about the importance of these differences, typically over the objection of 
the proponent. For example, the staff, rather than shareholders, deter-
mined that the need for the external monitor to be a “respected human 
rights organization” was sufficiently unimportant to permit exclusion.100   
The approach paints an unfortunate picture of shareholders. A rea-
sonable proponent would generally not waste the time or resources to 
recommend action that a company has already taken. By disregarding the 
  
 100. The Talbots Inc, SEC No-Action Letter, 2002 WL 1058537 (Apr. 5, 2002).  
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differences in the shareholder proposal and the management action, the 
staff implies that the proponent and other shareholders are not able to 
evaluate current policies in relation to those suggested.   
The staff’s role likely increases the number of challenges by com-
panies to proposals101 and inhibits shareholder participation; something 
made more problematic considering that Rule 14a-8 is the only practical 
method for shareholders to address, collectively, changes to corporate 
policies. The approach also effectively denies the board of directors in-
formation about the collective views of shareholders. Most shareholder 
proposals merely recommend, not mandate, the company to take action. 
Regardless of whether the proposal receives a majority vote, tabulation 
provides quantitative data illustrating the opinions of shareholders. Broad 
exclusion under 14a-8(i)(10) makes the information unavailable.  
Where objective differences are present, shareholders are better sit-
uated than SEC staff to determine whether the company should consider 
the recommendation. The staff should return to the original purpose of 
the exclusion, permitting the omission of proposals that are moot. Where 
differences exist, the burden in the Rule rests with management to estab-
lish the availability of the exclusion.102 Particularly where shareholders 
disagree that management’s alternative substantially implements the pro-
posal, the staff should err on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion. 




 101. Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., Takeover Defense: Mergers and Acquisitions, § 10.08 
STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS (2016) (“This exclusion was granted more frequently in 2008 than in 
prior years on the grounds that the companies had already implemented the proposed changes or 
were proposing to submit them for shareholder approval.”). 
 102. The company has the burden of demonstrating the availability of the exemptions. See 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(g). 
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